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The high rates of unemployment characterizing most of the European coun-
tries in the nineties have stimulated debates about the role and the eﬃciency
of the institutions and the rules that regulate labor markets.
It is frequently argued that the strict regulations of the European labor mar-
kets can have a role in explaining the poor employment performances of the
European countries (Bentolila and Bertola (1990)). Generous unemployment
beneﬁts, restrictions on hiring1 and ﬁring are examples that have led to rigid
European labor markets.
Moreover, economists have long been concerned with the inﬂuence of ﬁrm
ﬁrm size on economic performance (Schumpeter (1911)) and, as a conse-
quences, with its determinants (Lucas (1978)). A robust empirical ﬁnding
is that average ﬁrm size varies substantially even across countries at simi-
lar stage of development (Schivardi and Torrini (2004)). Bartelsman et al.
(2003) report the average ﬁrm size for a set of Oecd countries for broad
sectoral subdivisions. In manufacturing, for example, the average number
of employees ranges from 80:3 in US, to 39 in Germany and 32 in France,
reaching a minimum of 15:3 in Italy. These variations are conﬁrmed by
more sectoral disaggregated studies (Kumar et al. (1999)). In particular,
cross-countries diﬀerences are not simply driven by the sectoral composi-
tion of the economy; rather, countries with a large overall size tend to show
the same pattern even within narrowly deﬁned sector2. This suggests that
ﬁrm size distribution might have an important country speciﬁc component
(Schivardi and Torrini (2004)).
Notwithstanding the relevance of these cross-countries diﬀerences, very little
is known about their causes (Schivardi and Torrini (2004)). On the attempt
to understand the forces behind country speciﬁc patterns, a branch of the
literature3 concentrated its attention on the role of labor market institutions,
pointing on a particular institutional features, i.e. Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL).
In the last decades, in fact, the role of EPL has attracted a large inter-
est among labor economists and policy makers. The accumulated empirical
evidences and theoretical analysis has greatly improved, in particular, the
overall understanding on the eﬀects of Employment Protection on the aggre-
gated labor markets. The main empirical results in this ﬁeld are that EPL re-
duces unemployment inﬂows and outﬂows, since countries with stricter EPL
are associated with higher youth unemployment and larger self-employment
(Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
From a theoretical point of view, most of the contributions treat the EPL as
1The restrictions on hiring refer, for example, to the mandatory quotas on hiring, the
obligations on hiring disadvantaged workers, and so on.
2See, for example, Davis and Henrekson (1999) and Pagano and Schivardi (2003).
3See, for example, Garibaldi et al. (2003) and Pagano and Schivardi (2003).
1a tax on labor shedding4(Garibaldi et al. (2003)), without establishing any
uncontroversial link between EPL per se and average ﬁrm size5 (Schivardi
and Torrini (2004)).
Most of the empirical literature works with macroeconomic data and an-
alyzes the eﬀect of Employment Protection on aggregate labor ﬂows and
stocks. The use of individual and ﬁrm level data in these analysis is more
recent. For example, Kugler (1999) investigates the impact of ﬁring costs on
turnover and unemployment, in the context of the Colombian labor market
reform. She ﬁnds an increase in the hazard rates into and out of unem-
ployment for formal workers. Blanchard and Portugal (1998) ﬁnds that the
higher employment protection is associated with lower ﬂows and higher un-
employment duration, with an ambiguous eﬀect on unemployment rate.
Despite the increasing interest on the micro eﬀects of the Employment Pro-
tection Legislation on the labor market, little attention has been devoted to
the eﬀect of EPL on the size distribution of ﬁrms and on the hiring behavior
of ﬁrms with diﬀerent size6, in spite of the fact that in most of European
countries the EPL varies across ﬁrms of diﬀerent size7. In this context, Italy
surely represents an interesting case. In fact, in the existing Italian legis-
lation ﬁrms with more than 15 employees (i.e. threshold size for change in
EPL level) are subject to stricter EPL.
Studies8 on Italian data have been unable to ﬁnd any eﬀects of the threshold
on the size distribution. Anastasia (1999) studied the ﬁrm size distribution
in the Italian economy and in Veneto (a large Italian region), and did not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant bunching of ﬁrm close to the threshold. Tattara (1999)
focused on two Italian provinces of the Veneto region, and did not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant threshold eﬀect on accession and separation rates of workers, as
well as on the probability of growing/shrinking of ﬁrms close to the 15 em-
ployees threshold (Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
Most of these works don’t considered how the 15 employees threshold is com-
puted. Some categories of workers, in fact, are not counted in the threshold
(for examples, apprentices, short temporary contracts). This aspect together
with the variable enforcement of Employment Protection might lead to some
bias on the hiring behavior of ﬁrms close to the threshold.
The aim of this paper is then to investigate, both theoretically and empiri-
4See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1999).
5Bentolila and Bertola (1990), for example, show that ﬁring costs reduce employment
turnover, but have only second order eﬀects on average employment.
6See, for example, Bauer et al. (2004), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Boeri and Jimeno
(2003).
7For example, in Germany and Austria establishments with less than 6 employees
are exempted from EPL, while in France ﬁrms with less than 10; in Spain, 40% of the
severance payment due upon dismissal is covered by a state fund for ﬁrms with less than
25 employees.
8Excluding Garibaldi et al. (2003) and Schivardi and Torrini (2004) that individualized
some small but signiﬁcant threshold eﬀects on ﬁrms size growth.
2cally, the eﬀect of the variable enforcement of Employment Protection on the
growth’s dynamics and the hiring behavior of ﬁrms close to the threshold.
I construct a model that determines the conditions under which a ﬁrm de-
cides to upsize or not, and whether to hire a temporary worker or not, when
there is some level of Employment Protection. The model considers both the
case in which the EPL is homogenously and variable enforced by ﬁrm size.
To test the empirical implications of the model, data drawn from the Veneto
Worker History (VWH) data set from 1982 to 1997 are used. VWH is a
longitudinal rotating panel based on the Social Security Adminstration data
for Veneto collected by the Italian Social Security System (Inps).
A random eﬀect analysis has been performed and the main ﬁnding is that
ﬁrms close to the threshold are not scared to upsize, but they are more likely
to hire apprentices than permanent workers. Finally, I perform an evalu-
ation analysis of the reform occurred in Italy in 1990, which modiﬁed the
dismissal protection legislation for ﬁrms with less than 15 employees, using
a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) approach.
The paper is organized as follow. Next section provides a brief description of
the institutional setting in Italy. Third section presents the model and the
empirical implications. Fourth section discusses the data and the empirical
strategy. The ﬁfth presents the results. The sixth discusses the 1990 reform.
Finally, last section oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Institutional settings
In economies in which "employment at will" does not apply9, ﬁring costs
can be thought as the results of three main elements: the deﬁnition of fair
and unfair dismissal; the cost of a no-fault dismissal and the penalty when
the dismissal is ruled to be unfair; the odds for the results of a possible trial.
The ﬁrst deﬁnes when the ﬁring is allowed; the second assesses the costs a
ﬁrm can incur; the third describes the actual enforcement of the law and
the probability of winning a case of unfair dismissal (Schivardi and Torrini
(2004)).
Within the actual institutional setting, there are ﬁve types of regulations that
depends on ﬁrm’s size: Employment Protection (EPL), mandatory quotas
on hiring, ﬁrm’s level rights to organize union related institutions, ﬁrm safety
standards and collective dismissal rules (Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
Surely, the most important institutional constraint is linked to the individ-
ual dismissal procedures, as legislated in the Articolo 18 of the Labor Code
(Statuto dei Lavoratori). In particular, an individual dismissal must be jus-
tiﬁed by a just cause rule, and workers have the right to appeal ﬁrm initiated
9Strictly speaking, even in US, whose legislation is considered one of the less stringent
among the industrialized countries, employment at will does not apply anymore, as several
exception has been introduced by courts (Autor et al. (2005)).
3dismissal. In other words, workers can be ﬁred because of misbehavior (giusta
causa or giustiﬁcato motivo) or the ﬁrm’s need to downsize or reorganize its
activities (giustiﬁcato motivo oggettivo) (Schivardi and Torrini (2004)).
Workers can appeal to the court against dismissal. Whenever a judge rules
the dismissal as unfair, workers are entitled to compensation that depends
on ﬁrm size.
After 1990, ﬁrm employing less than 15 employees must compensate the un-
lawfully dismissed worker and pay a severance payment that varies between a
minimum of 2:5 to a maximum of 6 months (the so-called tutela obbligatoria.
Conversely, ﬁrms employing more that 15 employees must compensate the
worker for forgone wages in the time elapsed between the dismissal and the
sentence. Moreover, ﬁrms are obliged to rehire the worker (tutela reale)10.
If the worker does not exercise the option to be reinstated, he or she receives
a payment of 15 months of salary (Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
A critical variable in determining the expected ﬁring costs in Italy is the
uncertainty about the result of the trial. The actual application of the rule
is always diﬃcult to assess, as it depends critically on the courts and on the
judge’s interpretation of the law11.
Thus, the expected ﬁring costs should be substantially higher for ﬁrms with
more than 15 employees, to which the Articolo 18 applies.
There are other relevant constraints that apply above a given threshold12.
Firms employing more than 10 workers are obliged to hire disadvantaged
workers (i.e. oﬃcially registered long term unemployed). Further, as of
1999, ﬁrms employing more than 15 employees must employ disabled work-
ers. Further, workers are entitled to set up a ﬁrm level institution that has the
right to call general meetings, establish referendum, and post union related
poster within the establishment. Also, ﬁrms with more than 15 employees
have the right to vote for a workers representative for safety related issues.
Finally, since 1991, collective dismissal procedures are in place above the 15
employees threshold. This procedure requires a credible risk of bankruptcy
and requires the dismissal of at least 5 employees13; it implies negotiations
with the unions but does not generate ﬁring costs (or reinstatement risk)
when implemented (Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
10This case is diﬀerent from discriminatory dismissal (base on race, gender, political
opinion, etc.) where the reinstatement is automatic and independent of ﬁrms size.
11Some Italian jurist deem the discretionary power of judges to far reaching (Ichino
(1996)), so that ﬁrms undergoing a trial for unfair dismissal would not be sure of the
result even when the dismissal is justiﬁed. In fact, the ﬁrm bear the burden of the proof.
The judge’s discretionary power is limited when the dismissal is due to the need to reduce
the employment or reorganize the production process (Ichino (1996)).
12These thresholds are computed according to rules that are somehow diﬀerent from
those relevant for the Article 18 detailed above.
13Firms undergoing temporary crisis may access to supplementation schemes instead of
ﬁring part of their work force. The wages are temporarily paid by supplementation funds
and the employment spell is not broken.
42.1 The threshold
The computation of the threshold is complex. The 15 employees refers to
establishment as long as plants are located in the same city. In addition, the
15 employees refer to the date in which the ﬁring is intimated, which can be
ahead of the actual separation date. Further, apprentices, temporary work-
ers below 9 months contract’s length should not be computed. Conversely,
part time workers should be included in proportion of their actual working
time. Finally, any form of employment which does not classify as dependent
employment (interim workers, full time and part time consultants) should
not be included in the Labor Code based deﬁnition of employment (Garibaldi
et al. (2003)).
3 The model
EPL is traditionally modeled as a ﬁring tax on labor shedding, and the
original theoretical framework is the dynamic demand under uncertainty14
(Garibaldi et al. (2003)). Most of this literature takes EPL as given, and
looks at the employment eﬀect of diﬀerent degrees of job security provisions
(Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
To assess the eﬀect of variable enforcement of Employment Protection on
the hiring behavior of ﬁrms a threshold eﬀect is introduced in a toy model
of labor demand15, deriving empirical predictions that mostly refers to in-
creasing persistence in employment dynamics right below the threshold, i.e.
ﬁrms close to threshold size are more reluctant to hire.
Another way to look at this issue is to construct a buﬀer stock model of la-
bor demand. In other words, a ﬁrm can combine permanent and temporary
contract at the same time. The idea is that the ﬁrm can hire a stock of
permanent workers and can hire workers under temporary contracts when
conditions are good, and dismiss them when conditions are bad (Garibaldi
(2006)). Adding to this model ﬁring and turnover costs is possible to con-
struct a model that determines under which conditions a ﬁrm prefers to hire
a permanent workers rather than a temporary one16.
Considering that in Italy the EPL is diﬀerentiated by ﬁrm size and that
some categories of temporary workers are not counted in the 15’s employees
threshold, this type of model appears particularly suitable17.
14See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990).
15See, for example, Garibaldi et al. (2003).
16See Garibaldi (2006) for further details.
17For simplicity of exposition I didn’t insert comparative. For details about comparative
statics contact the author.
53.1 The general model set up
The model, built on the one described by Garibaldi (2006), is a two period
model and in the ﬁrst period is a positive demand shock. At this stage the
ﬁrm can choose between diﬀerent alternatives: it maintains the same size
and employs the workers for a large number of hours (overtime); it hires a
new permanent worker or it hires a new temporary worker. Both temporary
and permanent workers are equally paid and equally skilled.
Let’s deﬁne y as the level of production in the ﬁrst period (after the positive
shock), c is the labor cost and is deﬁned as the product between the hourly
wage (w), the number of workers (l) and the hours worked (h0 is the "normal"
number of hours settled by law or national agreements).
To establish the circumstances under which a ﬁrm chooses among the options
listed above, I ﬁrst deﬁne the present discounted value (PDV) for each of the
three possibilities.
Let’s consider ﬁrst the case in which the ﬁrm decides to increase the hours
worked to the level h. For each extra hour the ﬁrm has to pay an extra wage,
thus the labor costs is:
c = wlh0 + ~ wl(h ¡ h0) (1)
where ~ w is the extra wage paid for working overtime. In the second period,
the productivity is random: with probability ± the productivity will be lower
(y2) than in the ﬁrst period (i.e. the positive shock is not permanent) and the
hours worked need to be reduced, with probability (1 ¡ ±) the productivity
in the second period stays at y (i.e. the positive shock is permanent). The
PDV18 of having employees working overtime is then:
PDVovt =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r







Let’s consider then the two situations in which the ﬁrm decides to upsize.
When the ﬁrm decides to oﬀer a temporary contract (which last 1 period),
the job can be terminated at no cost at the beginning of period 2; when
the ﬁrm oﬀers a permanent contract (which is a 2 period contract) the ﬁrm
can terminate the job at a cost equal to ¡T. Even though the job ﬁlled
by a temporary contract can terminate with no cost at the end of period 1,
the worker can decide to quit and ﬁnd another job somewhere else. Let’s
deﬁne ¸ as the probability that the temporary workers decide to quit. If the
worker leaves, the ﬁrm has a chance to ﬁnd a replacement. However, there
is a positive probability that a replacement is not found: q is the probability
that a replacement is successfully found (Garibaldi (2006)).
Consider ﬁrst the case in which the ﬁrm decides to hire a permanent worker.
18For a formal derivation of the present discounted value see Appendix A.
6The PDV is as follow:
PDVperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0] +
±
1 + r
[y2 ¡ wlh0 ¡ T] (3)
where l019 is the new level of employment.
In the case in which the ﬁrm decides to hire a temporary worker the PDV
is:
PDVtemp =






Following Garibaldi (2006), let’s deﬁne the convenience of the ﬁrm to upsize
with a permanent contract as:
¢upperm = PDVperm ¡ PDVovt (5)
where ¢ is the net beneﬁt associated with the upsize. The ﬁrm oﬀers a
permanent contract if and only if ¢upperm > 0.
Using the deﬁnition 2.2 and 2.3:
¢upperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r




In the same way, I can deﬁne:
¢uptemp =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r
[wlh0+ ~ wl(h¡h0)¡wl0h0]+




where ¢ is the net beneﬁt associated with the hiring of a temporary contract.
¢tempperm =
±¸ + ¸q ¡ ±¸q ¡ ¸
1 + r




In this case, ¢ is the net beneﬁt associated with hiring a temporary worker
instead of a permanent one.
Some conclusions immediately follow20.
Proposition 1 In absence of uncertainty (i.e. ± = 0) and/or with no ﬁring
costs (i.e. T = 0), it’s more convenient to oﬀer a permanent contract as
long as
wlh0 < ~ wl(h ¡ h0) (9)
19Considering that I’m looking at the behavior at the margin, l
0 can be rewritten as
l
0 = l + 1.
20See Appendix A.
7The risk associated to the hiring of a temporary worker is represented by the
probability of quitting before the end of the contract (i.e. ¸) and the proba-
bility to ﬁnd a successful replacement (i.e. q). Looking to these parameters,
a general conclusion immediately follows.
Proposition 2 If the probability of quitting is small (i.e. ¸ = 0) and the
probability of ﬁnd a successful replacement is high (i.e. q = 1), it’s more
convenient to hire a temporary contract as long as condition (2.9) holds.
3.2 The threshold eﬀect
Let’s assume that the ﬁring costs are diﬀerentiated by ﬁrm size, i.e. ﬁring
costs are positive above a certain threshold (¹ L) measured by a stated number
of employees.
The ﬁring costs T, thus, can be decomposed in two part: TL are ﬁring costs
related to the previous level of employment; ¢T is the variation in the ﬁring
costs dues to the change in the level of employment. The ﬁring costs will be
then:
TL0 = TL + ¢T (10)
Let’s consider ﬁrst the case in which L < ¹ L and L0 < ¹ L (i.e. "very small"
ﬁrm). In this case, TL = 0 and ¢T = 0. The PDVperm will be:
PDVperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0] +
±
1 + r
[y2 ¡ wlh0] (11)
Given the new PDV the convenience on hiring a permanent worker with
respect to working overtime is:
¢upperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r
[ ~ wl(h ¡ h0) + wlh0 ¡ wl0h0] (12)
while the ¢tempperm is given by:
¢tempperm =
±¸ + ¸q ¡ ±¸q ¡ ¸
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0] (13)
From (2.12) and (2.13) a proposition immediately follows:
Proposition 3 It will be always more convenient to hire a permanent work-
ers as long as:
wh0 < ~ wl(h ¡ h0) (14)
In other words, the "very small ﬁrms", if the cost of an additional worker is
lower than the cost of overtime, has more convenience on hiring a permanent
worker.
Let’s consider now the other extreme case: the "big ﬁrms". In this case,
8L ¸ ¹ L and L0 ¸ ¹ L, consequently TL > 0 and ¢T = 0. The PDVperm will
then become:
PDVperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0] +
±
1 + r
[y2 ¡ wlh0 ¡ TL] (15)
From (2.15) the ¢upperm and ¢tempperm are immediately derived:
¢upperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r





±¸ + ¸q ¡ ±¸q ¡ ¸
1 + r




The same conclusions obtained for the general case can be applied.
Finally, let’s consider the ﬁrms with size close to the threshold. In this case,
L < ¹ L, L0 ¸ ¹ L and, consequently, TL = 0 and ¢T > 0. The PDVperm will
be:
PDVperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0] +
±
1 + r
[y2 ¡ wlh0 ¡ ¢T] (18)
The change in the level of ﬁring costs (i.e. ¢T) represents a cost when the
ﬁrm hires a permanent worker, while could be seen as a gain when the ﬁrm
hires a temporary workers who is not counted in the threshold21.
Consequently, the PDVtemp becomes:
PDVtemp =







From (2.18) and (2.19) the expressions for ¢upperm and ¢tempperm immedi-
ately follow:
¢upperm =
2 + r ¡ ±
1 + r





±¸ + ¸q ¡ ±¸q ¡ ¸
1 + r




Also in this case, the conclusions derived for the general case can be applied.
To conclude, the model suggests that the net beneﬁt deriving from upsizing





21With respect to the threshold, the hiring of a temporary worker is akin to not upsize.
9The gain deriving from hiring a temporary worker instead of a permanent









The ﬁrst general implication deriving from the model is that if there is a
permanent positive shock the ﬁrms are more likely to upsize and to hire per-
manent workers (i.e. the PDVperm is increasing in ±, while PDVovertime is
decreasing in ±).
Considering the situation in which the Employment Protection is diﬀerenti-
ated by size, two implications are derived from the model. First, the con-
venience to upsize is increasing in size and there is no space for a threshold
eﬀect on the growing choice of the ﬁrms. Secondly, the ﬁrm close to the
threshold have an higher gain on hiring a temporary worker that on hiring a
permanent one. This implies the existence of a threshold eﬀect on the hiring
decisions of the ﬁrms.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 The Data
Data are from the Veneto Worker History (VWH) data set. The VWH data
set is a longitudinal rotating panel built at the Department of Economics of
the University of Venice on the ground of the Social Security Administrative
data of the Italian Social Security System (Inps). It refers to the entire pop-
ulation of employers and employees in Veneto.
VWH data include register-based information on all establishments and em-
ployees that have been hired by those establishments for at least one day
during the period of observation and the entire working life of all the em-
ployees has been reconstructed.
I select all the establishments with at least 1 year of life and a size between
1 and 30 employees in the period from 1982 to 199722, obtaining a sample of
1;604;459 observations. For each plant, I compute the stock of employment,
the stock of apprentices and the stock of permanent workers for each year23.
I gather information on demand shocks occurred in this period from data
related to the Veneto export at the industry level and regional GDP24.
22Data relative to the period before 1982 has been excluded for reliability problems as
well as the data after 1997.
23The stocks are computed considering the individuals employed in the ﬁrm the 31th of
October.
24These data come from Istat public data on import and export. Data related to GDP
variations come from Prometeia.
10In tab. 125, the composition of the sample is described. The majority of the
ﬁrms are more than 6 years old; the ﬁrms are equally distributed between
manufacturing and services. In the same way, from a geographical point
of view, the ﬁrms are more concentrated in the 5 main provinces (Treviso,
Padova, Verona, Vicenza and Venezia).
Fig. 1: Average ﬁrm size by sector - Veneto 1982-1997
Note: VWH data.
In ﬁg. 1 and 2 are represented, respectively, the average ﬁrm’s size by year,
diﬀerentiated by broad sectorial division and the average ﬁrm’s size together
with the GDP variations for Veneto.
The average ﬁrm’s size in Veneto is very small (about 4 employees per ﬁrm),
it has increased since the beginning of nineties, and it has remained stable
afterwards.
Despite the high variability of the GDP the average size of the ﬁrm remains
stable along all the period considered.
Figure 3 shows the number of ﬁrms by size class, where the size class is
calculated using total employment. Figure 4, instead, shows the number of
ﬁrms by size class using the "threshold" employment. In other words, each
size class in constructed using the total employment minus the workers that
are not counted in the threshold (i.e. apprentices).
The interesting aspect highlighted by the two graph is that looking to both
total size and "threshold" size there is no evidence of an higher concentration
of ﬁrms in the classes close to the threshold level of 15 employees. This could
be seen as a ﬁrst indication of the rightness of the ﬁrst implication of the
model, saying that the ﬁrms close to the threshold are not scared to upsize.
25See Appendix B.
11Fig. 2: Average ﬁrm size and GDP - Veneto 1982-1997
Note: VWH data and Istat.
Fig. 3: Number of ﬁrm by size class - Veneto 1982-1997
Note: VWH data.
12Fig. 4: Number of ﬁrm by "threshold" size class - Veneto 1982-1997
Note: VWH data.
Fig. 5: Percentage of ﬁrm hiring apprentices by "threshold" size class - Veneto 1982-1997
Note: VWH data.
13Finally, ﬁgure 5 shows the percentage of ﬁrms hiring apprentices on the total
number of upsizing ﬁrms, by "threshold" size class.
The graph gives an intuition of the existence of a threshold eﬀect on the
use of apprentices. In fact, the percentage of ﬁrms hiring apprentices is
increasing in size and it reach at the 15 employees class and, for greater
classes, is decreasing dramatically.
4.2 Empirical strategy
In order to test the empirical implications deriving from the model I use
three diﬀerent speciﬁcation. First, I consider the following equation:
yit = ® + ¯Xi +
n X
k=1
°kDsize + ui + "it (24)
where yi is the outcome variable, i.e. yearly variations in the number of
workers hired each year. Xi is a set of control variables composed by ﬁrm’s
age, age squared, industry dummies, year dummies, provincial dummies,
GDP and export; ui is the random disturbances. Finally, Dsize is a set of
size dummies, taking value 1 if the "threshold size" of the ﬁrm is equal to k
(k = 1;:::;30) and 0 otherwise.
I used the dummy relatives to the 15 employees size as baseline.
In the second speciﬁcation, I estimated the same equation inserting all size
dummies in order to see the eﬀect at the threshold size (i.e. size15).
Finally, I estimated the following equations:
yit = ® + ¯Xi + °Big + ui + "it (25)
yit = ® + ¯Xi + °small + ui + "it (26)
where, instead of using the size dummies I use a variable measuring the
distance from the threshold size. In particular, Big refers to ﬁrm greater
than 15 employees and small refers to ﬁrms smaller than 15 employees.
All the speciﬁcations have been estimated with a panel random ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator. This choice is particularly suitable if the sample is drawn from a
large population, as in my case.
Each speciﬁcation has been estimated separately for yearly variations in
the number of permanent workers and yearly variations in the number of
apprentices. Moreover, the estimations have been carried out separately
on the overall sample and by broad sectorial divisions (manufacturing and
services).
145 Results
The two main implications deriving from the model, in a situation of vari-
able enforcement of EPL, are: there is no threshold eﬀect on the upsizing
behavior of the ﬁrm (i.e. the ﬁrms with a size close to 15 employees are
not scared to upsize) and, on the other hand, there is a threshold eﬀect on
the hiring behavior of the ﬁrms (i.e. the ﬁrms close to the 15 employees
threshold prefer to hire apprentices than permanent workers).
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the model uses the dummy relatives to the 15 em-
ployees size as baseline. Table 3 and 426 shows the estimation results respec-
tively for the yearly variations of permanent workers and apprentices.
Looking at the behavior around the threshold in tab. 3, there is no evidence
of a threshold eﬀect. In fact, the sign of the size14 dummy is negative and
the sign of the size16 dummy is positive. This means that, with respect
to ﬁrms with 15 employees, ﬁrms with 14 employees hire a lower number
of permanent workers and, on the other hand, ﬁrms with 16 employees hire
more permanent workers. Thus, the convenience on upsizing with permanent
workers is increasing in size and the "threshold" ﬁrms has not a lower con-
venience on upsizing than all other ﬁrms. This results are conﬁrmed looking
at manufacturing and services separately27.
In tab. 4, looking at the sign of the size14 and size16 signs, some evidences
of a threshold eﬀect, on the yearly variations of in the number of apprentices
hired, appear. In fact, the sign for both dummies is negative. This means
that ﬁrm with 14 and 16 employees hire less apprentices than ﬁrms with 15
employees. Also in this case, the results are conﬁrmed looking to manufac-
turing and services separately.
To support the results obtained in this speciﬁcation, I insert in the regres-
sion a variable measuring the size distance from the threshold ("small" is the
distance from the threshold for ﬁrm with less than 15 employees and "big"
is the distance from the threshold for ﬁrms with more than 15 employees).
Table 6 and 6bis shows the estimation results. The number of permanent
workers hired is decreasing moving along smaller sizes and increasing moving
along bigger sizes. Conversely, the number of apprentices hired is decreasing
in both directions. The results are the same both for manufacturing and
services.
Tab. 5 shows that for ﬁrms with 15 employees the eﬀect on the number of
permanent workers hired is positive, lower than for ﬁrms with 16 employees
and greater (and diﬀerent in sign) than for ﬁrms with 14 employees. The
eﬀects are particularly strong for the services sector. Finally, tab. 5bis shows
that for ﬁrms with 15 employees the eﬀect on the number of apprentices hired
is negative but smaller than for ﬁrms with 14 employees and 16 employees.
26See Appendix C.
27The results are highly signiﬁcant for services.
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6.1 Institutional changes
In 1990 the Italian legislation on individual dismissal rules applied to small
ﬁrms changed drastically.
Before 1990, workers dismissed from small ﬁrms could not appeal the em-
ployer initiated dismissal, i.e. before 1990 ﬁrms employing less than 15 em-
ployees were not obliged to obey to "just cause" rule for their individual
dismissals.
Since 1990, small ﬁrms are required to justify their dismissals in accordance
to the Labour Code, and whenever the dismissal is ruled as unfair, they
are obliged to compensate the worker with a severance payment that varies
between 2.5 to 6 monthly wages (with the actual payment linked to the se-
niority of the dismissed worker)(Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
As far as individual dismissal are concerned, after 1990, the diﬀerence in
EPL between small and large ﬁrms was reduced: while large ﬁrm are obliged
to rehire unlawfully dismissed workers, small ﬁrms can compensate workers
through a severance payment. This policy change is akin to tightening in
EPL on small ﬁrms to large ﬁrms (Garibaldi et al. (2003)).
6.2 Empirical strategy
The reform occurred in 1990 introduced some Employment Protection also
for ﬁrms with less than 15 employees. This implies, looking at theoretical
model, a reduction of ¢T, thus a reduction on the convenience, for ﬁrms
close to the threshold size, on hiring apprentices.
To evaluate the impact of the reform, the presence of a threshold, makes the
Regression Discontinuity Design approach particularly suitable.
6.2.1 The Regression Discontinuity Design
The Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is quasi-experimental design
with the deﬁning characteristic that the probability of receiving treatment
changes discontinuously as a function of one or more underlying variables28
(Hahn et al. (2001)).
There are two main types of discontinuity designs considered in the literature:
the sharp design and the so-called fuzzy design. With a sharp design, the
treatment xi is known to depend in a deterministic way on some observable
variables zi - xi = f(zi), where zi takes a continuum of values. The point z0,
where the function f(zi) is discontinuous, is assumed to known (Hahn et al.
28The term Regression Discontinuity Design was ﬁrst introduced by Thistlethwhite and
Campbell (1960). Recent descriptions of the technique are Battistin and Rettore (2003)
and Hahn et al. (2001). Some recent applications include Card and Shore-Sheppard (2001),
Leonardi and Pica (2007).
16(2001)).
With a fuzzy design, xi is a random variable given zi, but the conditional
probability f(xi) ´ E[xijzi = z] = P[xijzi = z] is known to be discontinuous
at z0 (Hahn et al. (2001).
The fuzzy design diﬀers from sharp design in that the treatment assignment
is not a deterministic function of zi. The common feature it shares with
the sharp design is that the probability of receiving treatment, P[xi = 1jz],
viewed as a function of zi, is discontinuous in z0 (Hahn et al. (2001).
Given the model for the observed outcome can be written as:
yi = ®i + ¯ixi (27)
the common shape of the Regression Discontinuity Design estimator is:
¯ =
y+ ¡ y¡
x+ ¡ x¡ (28)
For both the designs the ratio identiﬁes the treatment eﬀect of z = z0.
Thus, given consistent estimators of the four one-sided limits in (2.25), the
treatment eﬀect can be consistently estimated by:
^ ¯ =
^ y+ ¡ ^ y¡
^ x+ ¡ ^ x¡ (29)
6.2.2 Estimation strategy
In the evaluation design of this reform, the discontinuity point is given by
the threshold size of 15 employees. Thus, the treatment group is composed
by ﬁrm with less than 15 employees and the control group is composed by
ﬁrm with more than 15 employees29.
Given that the level of EPL aﬀects diﬀerently ﬁrms depending on their size, it
can be argued that there is selection bias on the construction of the treatment
and the control groups (i.e. the threshold could be seen as exogenous). The
results obtained in the ﬁrst part of the paper, however, shows that there is
no threshold eﬀect on the upsizing behavior of ﬁrms, thus I can claim that
the threshold is exogenous.
Moreover, the identiﬁcation assumption in the RDD approach is essentially
that the average outcome for ﬁrms marginally above the threshold represents
a valid counterfactual for the treated just below the threshold (Leonardi and
Pica (2007)). Thus, I select ﬁrms with a size between 10 and 20 employees
and I estimate, using a panel random eﬀect estimator, the following equation:
Yit = ® + D15 + Post1990 + °D15 ¤ Post91 + ¯Xit + ui + "it (30)
29The construction of the groups is based on the "threshold size" of the ﬁrm (i.e. the
size is deﬁned by the number of permanent workers in each ﬁrm).
17where Yit is the number of apprentices hired by each ﬁrm; D15 is the treat-
ment dummy taking value 1 if ﬁrms have less than 15 employees and 0
otherwise; Post90 is the post-treatment dummy taking value 1 in the post-
treatment period and 0 otherwise; and, Xi is a set of control variable30; ui
is the random disturbances. The coeﬃcient ° associated to the interaction
term gives the measure of the impact of the reform.
The period considered is from 1982 to 1997. 1990 has been excluded consid-
ering that the reform occurred in July of this year and the hiring behavior
of ﬁrms are likely to be a mixture of pre and post reform period (Leonardi
and Pica (2007)).
Table 731 shows the estimation results. Contrarily on what expected, the
1990 reform had a positive impact on the use of apprentices by ﬁrm close
to the 15 employees threshold. However, the eﬀect is very small. This is
probably due to the fact that, even if it has been introduced some protec-
tion for workers hired in small ﬁrms, the diﬀerence in ﬁring costs between
small and big ﬁrms remain dramatically high and the convenience on hiring
apprentices is not reduced.
7 Concluding remark
This paper investigates the eﬀect of Employment Protection Legislation on
the hiring behavior of the ﬁrms when the level of EPL is diﬀerentiated by
ﬁrms size.
According to the model presented, the ﬁrm has, in case of positive shocks,
three possible choices: do not upsize (working overtime), hires a new perma-
nent worker, hires a new temporary workers. The ﬁrm chooses according to
the present discounted value of each option.
The two main implications of the model are that ﬁrms close to the threshold
size are not scared to upsize, but if they decide to upsize they have more
convenience on hiring a temporary worker who is not counted in the thresh-
old.
The two main simpliﬁcations of the model are that permanent and tempo-
rary workers are equally paid and equally skilled. This two assumption are
pretty strong considering that in the reality workers are heterogenous in both
senses.
However, the model could be easily extended in both directions. In the case
in which, permanent and temporary workers are not equally paid (reason-
ably I could argue that temporary workers are paid less), the evidence of
threshold eﬀect on the hiring behavior of ﬁrms should be strengthened. In
the case of heterogeneity in skill, the model should produces diﬀerent results
30See control variables in the general case.
31See Appendix D.
18for low and skill workers. For low skill workers, considering the absence of
the cost of training, the results should holds. For high skill workers, instead,
the higher convenience on hiring apprentices rather than permanent workers
should disappear.
Using the VWH data set for Veneto, from 1982 to 1997, it appears that there
is not a threshold eﬀect on the choice between upsizing with a permanent
workers and do not upsize. There is, instead, a threshold eﬀect on the use
of apprentices. Firms close to the threshold size hire more apprentices than
other ﬁrms.
An analysis of the reform occurred in Italy in 1990 has also been performed.
The introduction of some level of protection also for workers hired in ﬁrms
with less than 15 employees produced a reduction in the level of ﬁring costs
between small and big ﬁrms. The eﬀect should be a reduction of the conve-
nience for ﬁrms close to the threshold size on hiring apprentices.
The analysis performed using a RDD approach highlights a very small and
positive eﬀect on the number of apprentices hired by small ﬁrms close to the
threshold. This is probably due to the fact that the diﬀerence in the level of
ﬁring costs between small and big ﬁrms remains very high and the legislation
change doesn’t really modify the behavior of ﬁrms.
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21A The model
In the general model:
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In the threshold model for "small" ﬁrm:
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In the threshold model for "threshold" ﬁrm:
PDVperm = [y ¡ wl0h0] +








(2 + r ¡ ±)
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0] +
±
1 + r
[y2 ¡ wlh0 ¡ ¢T]
23PDVtemp = [y ¡ wl0h0] +








(2 + r ¡ ± ¡ ¸ + ±¸ + ¸q ¡ ±¸q)
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0] +
±
1 + r
[y2 ¡ wlh0 + ¢T]
¢upperm =
















(2 + r ¡ ±)
1 + r
[y ¡ wl0h0 ¡ y + ~ wl(h ¡ h0)] + wlh0] +
±
1 + r
[y2 ¡ ¢T ¡ y2] =
=
(2 + r ¡ ±)
1 + r


















(2 + r ¡ ±)
1 + r
[y¡wl0h0¡y+wl0h0]+










(±¸ ¡ ¸ + ¸q ¡ ±¸q)
1 + r





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Estimation results: Upsizing with permanent workers














size9 -0.033 -0.003 -0.045
(0.021) (0.030) (0.033)

















































year dummies yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes
provincial dummies yes yes yes
N.Obs 411;495 164;574 246;921
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance; 4 digits industry dummies; the dummy corresponding
to 15 employees size has been used as baseline.
26Tab. 4: Estimation results: Upsizing with apprentices

































































exp -0.005 0.023 -0.024
¤¤¤
(0.007) (0.016) (0.006)
year dummies yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes
provincial dummies yes yes yes
N.Obs 324;800 123;288 201;512
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance; 4 digits industry dummies; the dummy corresponding
to 15 employees size has been used as baseline.
27Tab. 5: Estimation results: Eﬀects at 15 employees size on hiring of permanent workers













N.Obs 411;495 164;574 246;921
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Tab. 5bis: Estimation results: Eﬀects at 15 employees size on hiring of apprentices














N.Obs 324;800 123;288 201;512
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
28Tab. 6: Estimation results: Eﬀects of the distance from the threshold on hiring permanent workers
All sample Manufacturing Services










N.Obs 11;185 7;887 3;298
N.Obs 145;686 85;140 60;546
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Tab. 6bis: Estimation results: Eﬀects of the distance from the threshold on hiring apprentices
All sample Manufacturing Services
Big (> 15 employees) ¡0:006 ¡0:007 0:002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010)





N.Obs 4;335 3;646 689
N.Obs 147;972 34;244 13;728
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
29D Reform
Tab. 7: Estimation results: 1990’s reform eﬀects on number of apprentices hired















control variables yes yes yes
N.Obs 145;247 108;681 36;566
Notes: The standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 10%, ** to 5%
and *** to 1% level of signiﬁcance.
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